Abstract-In this paper, we explore the usage of printed tags to authenticate products. Printed tags are a cheap alternative to RFID and other tag based systems and do not require specialized equipment. Due to the simplistic nature of such printed codes, many security issues like tag impersonation, server impersonation, reader impersonation, replay attacks and denial of service present in RFID based solutions need to be handled differently. We propose a cost-efficient scheme based on static tag based hash chains to address these security threats. We analyze the security characteristics of this scheme and compare it to other product authentication schemes that use RFID tags. Finally, we show that our proposed statically printed QR codes can be at least as secure as RFID tags.
I. INTRODUCTION
Economic effects of counterfeiting have been indicated that up to US$200 Billion of international trade have been in counterfeit and illegally copied goods in 2005 [1] . Multiple schemes based on RFID have been explored to tackle authenticate products and identify counterfeits [2] - [4] . RFID technology requires using specialized hardware to read RFID tags and might not be feasible for space-constrained packaging like pharmaceuticals. Printing a static code on a product for authentication is relatively simple and needs less specialized equipment. We chose to use a QR Code for its relative simplicity and ease of implementation. Additionally, a printed QR code can potentially have a larger bandwidth of data transfer than an RFID tag [5] - [7] . We implemented the reader as a mobile application running on a smartphone due to their ubiquity with general users and easy access to hardware that can be used to read QR codes and perform network operations. We chose to implement this application on the Android OS due to the availability of multiple open source libraries and ease of implementation. . First, we identify various security issues that exist while authenticating products and design a scheme to address them. A hash chain of a one-way cryptographic hash function is most appropriate for this problem. We also ensure that we do not create further security holes while using a significantly different medium of storing the last hash value in a static and publicly readable format. Then, we devise techniques to address the various security issues identified in our protocol.
Finally, we compare our scheme with other work in product authentication that mainly use RFID tags to achieve similar goals. We prove that statically printed tags are a cheap and easy to use alternative to RFID tags which can be designed to provide equivalent, if not better, security.
II. RELATED WORK
Lamport first described a scheme [8] to securely authenticate a user a finite number of times using a one-way encryption function. This allowed the system to authenticate passwords even if an intruder could eavesdrop or tamper with the communication between the user and the system in a computationally efficient manner.
The most common basic authentication scheme is RFID product authentication. At its bare bones, the tag is read by a reader, which contacts the server and checks that the tag is what it is supposed to be. There have been many schemes used to make this basic idea more secure.
Yang [9] proposed a hash-based RFID mutual authentication protocol. This scheme is based on the system structure similar to ours. It also uses a reader, a tag, and a server. Due to the high computational cost, this scheme is susceptible to denial of service attacks.
Tsudik [10] proposed a protocol to identify RFID tags untraceably, called YA-TRAP. Simply, the tag receives a message and checks that the time stamp with this message is after the previous time received and before the maximum that is set. The server validates the valid or invalid message from a hashtable for this tag. But, this protocol is very susceptive to denial of service attacks against the tag.
Henrici et al. [11] described a protocol in RFID systems that implemented a hash-chain called the Triggered Hash Chains Approach -where the value in the RFID tag is updated only when triggered by the backend server. This approach uses the reader simply as a channel of communication between the tag and the server which mutually authenticate each other Denial of service attacks are prevented by the system's ability to backtrack one step. Also, since different hashes are used on the ID and the messages, an insider attack is thwarted. There is some computation weight on the server but overall this is also a very non-complex protocol. There is no prevention against the fact that the hash chain will eventually loop which can result in creation of a counterfeit.
Cho et al. [12] designed a secret value hash-based mutual authentication protocol where Mutual Authentication between the tag and server occurs. This approach makes a strong assumption that the communication between the reader and server are over a secure channel. It is not possible to always ensure this.
Ohkubo et al. [7] created a Cryptographic Approach to "Privacy-Friendly" Tags. In this protocol the reader queries the tag. The tag then sends a hash of the secret information and using a different hash, changes the secret. The database does a calculation for each ID to see if it has received a valid hash of a valid secret, then returns the ID to the reader and updates its secret. This approach is susceptible to the same problem of a looping hash chain previously described. Also, if two secrets have a collision in their hash, the database will update the wrong IDs secret and give the reader the wrong ID.
Song et al. [13] created a RFID authentication protocol for low-cost tags. There are new random numbers between the server and tag which are XORed and bit-shifted to update secrets used each time, so replay attacks are prevented. Also, this scheme provides forward security because the new secret is created using both random numbers generated that round. Additionally, there is mutual authentication between tag and server. But, this protocol assumes that the communication between the reader and the server is secure, and the tag is susceptible to denial of service attacks. It does not check the initial random number received and thus can receive the same one repeatedly and try to keep up with its own calculations and responses and get overloaded.
In [10] , [13] , and many of the others it is assumed that there is a secure channel of communication between server and reader. In [9] it is discussed that most protocols make that assumption. However no network communication is completely secure. Yet, in many of these protocols, this assumption is stated without any reasoning behind it. It really is very peculiar. Also, the server in [10] is assumed not attackable. This is a completely unrealistic assumption with proper reasoning. In the protocol proposed in this paper, we make no such assumptions.
III. PROPOSED SCHEME
In this section, we describe our proposed scheme for product authentication using static QR code based hash chains. First we are going to discuss the design consideration of our scheme, explain our scheme, and then analyze our scheme.
A. Design Consideration
Most RFID solutions for product authentication use dynamic RFID tags. Some computation and complexity is thus at the RFID end of the scheme. Our solution, which uses a statically printed code, does not have the luxury of having the tag performing any sort of computation as it just contains a hash value. The computational complexity is thus delegated to
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Reader Server Fig. 1 . Communcation Overview the reader and server. The first requirement our scheme needed to have is to securely authenticate a product. Additionally, the number of times a product could be authenticated has to be chosen flexibly, depending on the application, to eventually prevent counterfeiting of the tag cloning. Finally our scheme must be available to the end-users for the product authentication purpose through widely used distribution method. Our scheme is based on three entities: tags, tag readers, and the authentication server.
Since the tags have only one functionality (being read), the responsibility of the dynamic tags such as RFID to keep the secret secure has now moved to the mutual responsibility of the tag reader and the authentication server. In addition, it is important that the revelation of the static tag on the product does not reveal any other important secret and the hash-chain technique will ensure this security. Limiting the total number that a product can be authenticated can work in analogous to secret revocation in case of secret leak. Moreover, by printing unique static tag on each individual product item, we can minimize the risk of mass revocation. Let's say an attacker creates C counterfeits of an individual product P . The manufacturer of P has set N authentications as the limit and has made M such products. Assuming that care is taken such that N P is always the case, the manufacturer's loss for this product goes from C/(C + M ) to P/(C + M ) which is also a smaller number. Thus, the lifetime of C is limited and easier to identify. One situation that we can consider is the authentication attempt by many customers before it is being purchased. Some product may not be scanned as frequently as some others and in order to handle this issue flexibly we make the authentication lifetime dependent on both the product item and the tag reader. This way a product item can be authenticated beyond the authentication lifetime if it is being scanned by different readers.
We have to design a reader capable of reading the QR code, processing the security protocol and relaying the correct information to the server. Because the QR Code is easy to be read by any third party, the protocol had to securely authenticate the read QR code between the reader and server. The message passing between the reader and server also had to be secured and authenticated to prevent replay and insider attacks. These can both be prevented by setting up a mutual authentication mechanism between in reader and the server. We achieved this by using a secret key that is hardcoded at both ends which is XORed and digested using a cryptographic hash function similar to the protocol described in [9] . This method allows us to generate communication tokens efficiently Figure. 2 and Figure. 3 in the perspective of the reader R id and the product P id . The notations used in our algorithm are summarized as below.
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C. Security Characteristics
There are many ways for an attacker to go after a security protocol. We have done our best to try and think of them and come up with the best way to counteract these attacks. Of course, no protocol is one hundred percent secure. The goal of our approach is to address all possible security issues present in the previously described protocols while maintaining the simplicity of being able to authenticate a product using just a static QR Code.
Firstly, to limit the lifetime of counterfeits, the number of authentications through the hash chains were made finite to a maximum number N through an established contract between the reader and server. The exact number N can be modified based on the actual application. The first value of a hash chain is always a randomly generated unique string for each individual product which is securely stored on the server when the product is registered with the server. The hash-chain for that product is also calculated at this time and a QR code the last hash value in the chain along with its unique product ID is generated. This process can easily be integrated into the product's package printing process.
Because the production of QR codes is cheap, a motivated attacker might obtain multiple valid products and with enough understanding or reverse engineering of the system, might create a few counterfeits of each QR code to create a large number of counterfeit products. As the intention of this scheme is for authenticating cheap, mass-produced items, this kind of effort might not be worthwhile for an attacker for the relative profits of such counterfeits. Furthermore, it will be physically time-consuming to obtain enough products with unique QR codes and individually copying each one. Some techniques like special inks that only work in a specific lighting condition that is made available in a retail store for consumers to check validity can also be used to combat such attacks.
The first time a reader is used, it registers its unique ID with the server and the first shared secret is generated at both ends using this ID. Through the use of shared secrets that update at each message exchange, the server and the reader mutually authenticate each other. Also, the update process of the secrets, and the use of the hash chain to check hash provides forward security. The mutual authentication and update of the secret prevents a fake reader and a fake server. Therefore, insider attacks are prevented through this protocol. The update of the secret also prevents a replay attack. The messages change for each authentication and thus the same one cannot be reused. Because the QR Code is just a statically printed code, denial of service attacks against it are trivially impossible. Denial of service attacks against the server can be prevented through various security measures like throttling and whitelisting/blacklisting IP addresses.
Also, a concern is a fake reader that impersonates the real reader and simply does not communicate with the server. The assumption we made here was that the distribution channellike an app market -handles the authenticity and security of such apps. Impersonating a reader that communicates with the server is impossible as they mutually authenticate each other. Also, it can be assumed that end-users who are conscious of product authentication are also inclined to only use authentic readers from the app market.
1) Forward Security: Forward security is ensured by the use of hash-chains. As only a middle value between the first and last value in the hash-chain, going backwards from the last value to the first, is ever revealed and this cannot be traced back due to the properties of cryptographic hash functions, forward security is maintained.
2) Denial of Service: Denial of service at the QR Code tag level involves obstruction/destruction of the tag which is trivial. This type of attack is not very beneficial to the attacker and only results in the authentication being denied. This is not preventable but the physical nature of the code means it is localized and difficult to damage codes on a large scale.
At the reader level, the application should be distributed through a secure channel like an app store. Thus, the app itself should be securely installed. Denial of service could involve disabling the camera or the smartphone itself, which is prevented by good design of the smartphone and is outside the scope of this project. No massive DoS attacks are practical to QR Codes or the reader app.
At the server level, as it is a HTTP(S) server, multiple types of denial of service attacks can occur. There are multiple research projects to address this and well known techniques exist to prevent denial of service for web servers. Also, the server operates in multiple authentication steps which involves lightweight computation such as just two hash functions. This eases the burden of handling DoS attacks on the server side.
3) Replay Attack: The lifetime of each Product ID and thus, each QR code is limited by the length of the hash chain. It can only be authenticated a finite number of times. Thus, it is infeasible to make a large number of a copies of a single QR code. This discourages copying (replaying) of QR codes.
There is mutual authentication between the reader and server using shared secrets when the reader requests to authenticate a certain code. As each message has a unique token depending on the current secret, each message is guaranteed to be unique. Thus, replay attacks can be prevented between the reader and server.
4) Insider Attack: The QR codes, being static, are trivially unaffacted by insider attacks.
The reader app needs to be distributed through a trusted and secure distribution channel like an app store to prevent insider attacks. Even if an attacker clones the reader app, because of the initial reader registration process and shared secrets and secret resynchronization, only a single clone will ever be validated at any given time. Multiple invalid requests from the same reader ID can be monitored and blocked at the server side. Furthermore, the mobile operating system should ensure that the app is sufficiently sandboxed and its inner functioning obfuscated to prevent intentional or accidental third party access.
The server will rely on standard web server techniques for prevention of insider attacks. 5) Mutual Authentication: As the QR Code itself is naive and unable to perform any computation, it cannot perform any sort of mutual authentication with the reader. Instead, the server will authenticate the QR Code. The reader and server mutually authenticate each other instead for an added layer of security.
IV. CONCLUSION
Most research in product authentication use RFID tags, which can be expensive, complicated and need special hardware for use. We approached this problem using a different perspective and attempted to use user-friendly mechanisms for product authentication. Due to the ubiquity of smartphones with cameras, and the ease of use of being able to scan a simple QR code, product authentication can be made easier and more available to a general audience. Overall, established that despite using a simpler medium like a QR code for storing security information, a protocol can be designed which can securely identify counterfeits and mitigate losses due to counterfeiting while empowering users to be more aware of the product they are using. It is fairly simple to build an application that piggybacks over this authentication scheme and allow companies to provide more detailed information about their product to users and engage with them. Table I shows a comparison of the security characteristics of our scheme to various product authentication schemes that use RFID. A Comparison of the complexity of the algorithms used can be seen in Table II . A key to the notation used is as follows.
H A single computation of a crpytographic hash function S Subtraction computation R A random number generation computation K A symmetric encryption/decryption computation L 128-bit variable stored N Number of tags stored in database M Modulo operation X XOR operation i
Rounding operation This scheme can also be structured to work with barcodes or simple black printing of the ID and the hash value. This is because a main assumption that we held while developing this scheme was that a counterfeiter could access the information in the QR Code. In other words, the information printed directly on a product was not assumed secure. Overall, our authentication scheme is a new twist on the research that has been done in this area. Most researchers concern themselves with the RFID tag, but that is too expensive to be considered for many small products. For example, you cannot put an RFID tag on every aspirin pill created. That is what this scheme looks at. We took the strategies implemented in RFID security and adapted them to create our scheme without an RFID tag.
In the future, this protocol can have a broader impact by using covert inks and specialized readers for an added layer of security [14] at the cost of reduced availability to the general public. Such a technique can be integrated into a product's supply chain to improve tracking by manufacturers and prevent loss, leakage or theft at any point. This scheme will have to be extended further to ensure that it can securely handle the complexities of a realistic supply chain while still maintaining simplicity and security.
Because of the widespread use of smartphones, other capabilities of these devices can be leveraged further in tackling counterfeits. Using the smartphone's location, an identified counterfeit can be geotagged and hotspots of counterfeiting can be recorded. This kind of data collected can be useful for investigative purposes for finding and tracking counterfeits.
Further work can also be done using similar schemes to authenticate digital media with embedded or steganographically hidden metadata since such an approach will rely on using static codes too.
